Saxenian's theory of "brain-circulation," which argues for a two way flow of technical communities instead of a one way brain drain or reverse brain drain, has turned from a theory to a popular formula for many policy makers of latecomer regions trying to jump-start their high-tech industries. Since the brain-circulation theory is primarily based on the experience of the Silicon Valley-Hsinchu connection, this article compares the Hsinchu experience with the Zhongguancun (ZGC) experience in Beijing to explain why ZGC is not a case for brain-circulation. By re-contextualizing the often neglected hypotheses of the brain-circulation theory, namely (i) decentralized industrial structure with specialized producer networks;(ii) trust-based inter-firm network that induces learning; (iii) critical financial infrastructure for high-tech startups; and (iv) the role of the state in facilitating technology transfer, this article explains why the effect of reciprocal industrial upgrading is not happening in ZGC.
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Through case studies, this article details a typology to understand the real role of Chinese returnees in the technological development of ZGC. Managing transnational innovation networks is a complex challenge that requires a long history of accumulation. Since the history of transnationalism in ZGC is 30 years shorter than Hsinchu, only a few very experienced Chinese returnees in ZGC have the accumulated ability to manage its transnational innovation networks. Moreover, knowledge assets (venture capital, research labs, research grant …etc) in ZGC are mostly institutionalized and controlled by the Chinese state.
Only a limited number of Chinese returnees can tap into them. These two barriers have limited the Chinese version of brain-circulation to only a few very experienced Chinese returnees with great political skills. The contribution of other types of Chinese returnees to the technological development of ZGC is limited and indirect. At this moment, they are to be able to create an informal industry-university linkage for exchange of human resources and technological information.
Introduction
The Beijing Zhongguancun (ZGC 1 ) Science Park authority is adopting the "reverse brain-drain" policy by aggressively attracting the Chinese returnees to establish their startups in one of the 23 "Overseas Student Venture Parks" in ZGC. Currently, there are around 6,000
Chinese returnees working in these parks. In contrast to the one way "brain-drain" or "reverse brain-drain" theories, brain-circulation -a term coined by Saxenianemphasizes the two way flow of skilled workers between home and host countries. 4 Chinese returnees are commonly refers to Chinese with PRC nationality who goes to the West (mainly the U.S., but also including Europe and Japan) for higher education. They might or might not have working experience in the West after their graduation. Increasingly, they also include who was hired directly by the companies in the West from China and return after a few years. Today, the halo of Chinese returnees has lost its luster because the term has been overloaded with cadres who claim to be "Chinese returnees" after only a short visit (less than 6 months) to the West. For the purpose of our paper, we would narrowly defined Chinese returnees as those who have substantial working experience in the West. They usually has a permanent resident or even citizenship of the Western countries. These Chinese returnees used to dream of working for the Fortune 500 companies in the US under H1 visa (with the opportunity to obtain a green card in three years). Now, many of them are heading back to China especially the NASDAQ crash in 2001. Some has return earlier in the 1990s for the rare 'window of opportunity' to start their own businesses as they are less technological competitor.
thesis will help us understand the real and limited effects of the Chinese returnees in the technological development 5 of Beijing's Zhongguancun, and perhaps of China in general as well.
This article argues that due to the different key aspects of the two regions, and also the difference of these two transnational technological networks, the impact of the ZGC-Silicon
Valley connection is quite different from the Taiwan case. While acknowledging the positive "brain-gain" in ZGC (with the increase in Chinese-returnee startups for example), the effect of reciprocal industrial upgrading of the Hsinchu and Silicon Valley case due to brain-circulation
is not yet noticeable in ZGC. This is inconclusive at best. 
A. Why the Chinese returnees?
The policy shift to attract Chinese returnees is the outcome of two frustrations faced by 5 The term industrial upgrading implies a collective phenomenon, which may be too restrictive for ZGC. Therefore, I use the term technological development, which does not assume a collective phenomenon, admits great unevenness among individual firms, but still acknowledges that certain types of Chinese returnees do have positive impacts on the technological accumulation in the region.
the Beijing technocrats in trying to speed up the industrial upgrading in ZGC, Beijing.
Chinese officials are suspicious of genuine MNC technology transfer
While the official public policy to attract multinational corporations to Beijing remains strong, Chinese technocrats in ZGC continue to be skeptical, or at least ambivalent, about the role of the MNCs in Beijing. They doubt whether the profit-oriented MNCs ever genuinely transfer technologies. 6 This ambivalence is much stronger among the technocrats in ZGC than in a highly commercial city like Shanghai.
7
The ambivalence increases with the increasing presence of multinationals in ZGC, especially with the arrival of multinational R&D centers since the mid 1990s. While the official rhetoric is always positive and welcoming, worries about the inability of local firms to compete with the "wolves" (a local word for multinationals) often emerge in the closed-door meetings I had with technocrats, journalists, scholars, engineers and even students in ZGC. The climax was the establishment of Microsoft Research China in 1998, which ignited a collective fear in ZGC. The common anxiety projected in the mass-media in 1998 showed that the public was worried about MNCs exploiting the skilled labor of China after they have successfully exploited the unskilled labor in southern China.
The deep anxiety and mistrust against MNCs has a long history. Since the Opium War, the local intellectual desire was for China to develop its own proprietary technology and science to 6 During my fieldwork in Beijing, I frequently encounter technocrats asking me if the MNC R&D centers will take the technology invented in Beijing and commercialize them somewhere else. They think the R&D centers are using the Chinese cheap skilled labor to develop new technology, and they will commercialize this new technology in their home country, and not in China, and thus, not contributing to the technological development of ZGC.
compete with the "colonizing" West. 8 In fact, nurturing China's own national champions in the area of communication, biochemistry, new materials, software and the internet has been the contemporary high-tech strategy. This strong "technological nationalism," as opposed to "technological globalism," 9 also legitimates the explicit "market for technology" policy that is commonly used by the Chinese central authorities to "force" (or strongly invite) large MNCs to transfer more technology to China. Examples such as requesting MNCs to set up R&D centers in China, to transfer their latest product or latest manufacturing technology to the joint-venture factory in China are abound. However, the real effect of "market for technology" in technology transfer is still debatable.
National champions are slow in creating proprietary technologies
In April 2002, a book by an embedded reporter in ZGC described the historical success of the local pioneers in ZGC since the 1980s. 10 It tells the story of locally trained IT heroes from the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and the Beijing universities succeeding in building their IT empires. These local heroes manage to break through the straight-jacket of the public research institutes 11 to "jump into the sea" and set up their institutional-affiliated startups Saxenian goes on to argue that "brain circulation" has resulted in the reciprocal industrial upgrading of the host and the home regions.
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On the surface, Taiwanese and Chinese transnational networks might look quite similar, as they are all returnees from the West (including Japan), especially from the Silicon Valley.
However, a closer look reveals their major structural differences in their respective regional economies. In fact, this paper identifies four major prerequisites (or hypotheses) of the brain-circulation theory, which are often neglected by policy makers and academics because they are too eager to adopt the brain-circulation theory as "best-practice" to jump-start their high-tech industry.
A. Re-contextualizing the brain-circulation thesis
The four major structural factors of the brain-circulation thesis are: (i) the industrial structure of both home and host regions of the returnees, e.g. networked vs. non-networked; (ii) trust, learning and entrepreneurship: collaboration vs. lock-in; (iii) the quality of the financial infrastructure for startups: established vs. weak; (iv) the role of the state as a technology producer vs. technology facilitator.
Below is the comparison of these main hypotheses behind the brain-circulation argument in contrast with the ZGC reality.
Industrial structure: networked vs. non-networked
Hsu (2004) Without a network of specialized suppliers, the start-up cost for new firms is high because they need to produce almost everything in-house. In addition, new startups find it difficult to position their goods and services in a niche market because of the lack of resource to do market research. As a result, "small and complete" 23 becomes the convention among ZGC startups.
"Small and complete" means no matter how small the startups, they still have to do everything themselves. This convention drains their resources and makes it difficult for startups to focus on specialized technology or product innovation. In short, the failure rate among the startupslocal or Chinese returnees -is very high. Thus, the survival of individual firms is already a challenge, let alone genuine technology innovation and industrial upgrading.
The trust and learning mechanism: collaboration vs. lock-in
According to Hsu and Saxenian (2000) , the agglomerated economies in Hsinchu and the The strong inter-firm spillover effects embedded in this decentralized industrial structure make the role of the technical community more important than in the case of a centralized industrial structure like Korea.
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Taiwan's tradition of collaborative entrepreneurship, relationship based business and resource-sharing among SMEs 25 was adopted into the high-tech sector. While keeping the trust-based business relations inherited from the traditional consumer goods sector, the Taiwanese high-tech sector (located in both the Silicon Valley and the Hsinchu regions)
abandoned the heavy reliance on family ties or primary social relations. 26 Giving up family ties while keeping the trust make it possible for Taiwanese high-tech firms to avoid being locked into the social relations while continuing to enjoy the collaborative division of labor and inter-firm learning in the high-tech sector of Hsinchu-Silicon Valley.
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Unfortunately, the existing guanxi-based relation in ZGC is different from the trust-based social relations built over three decades in Taiwan and the Silicon Valley. In Beijing, and China in general, it is difficult for the existing vertical guanxi-based relations (in both social and firm relations) of the origin SOE 28 -based industrial structure to transit to the horizontal inter-firm trust-based relations. In a similar fashion, the existing top-down guanxi between the Chinese state agencies and their IAS 29 also hinder the IAS from building horizontal inter-firm relations after they went private.
Moreover, the limits of the private capital market (including venture capital) forces the IAS to rely heavily on the state agencies for all kinds of resources (such as start-up fund, office space, experienced employees), approval documents, and even orders. In fact, the main orders of the IAS normally come from their original state agency through politicking with existing guanxi among stage agencies.
This dependency of IAS on vertical guanxi has two negative lock-in effects. Firstly, when the IAS really take off and make profit, they have a hard time breaking free from the state agencies that used to support them. Secondly, the dependency of IAS on vertical guanxi continues to exacerbate the distrust among IAS, and thus hinder the formation of horizontal trust-based relations in ZGC.
Without the horizontal and market-based trust, as in the Taiwanese case, strategic alliances and joint R&D among firms in ZGC is not common. Every firm (including IAS) holds back critical technological secrets and special institutional guanxi. Thus, these isolated firms are locked-into their own innovation without full knowledge of what others are doing. As a result, "low-level repetitive innovation" and "making tanks behind closed doors (閉門造車)" hinder the reciprocal learning that is prominent in Hsinchu and Silicon Valley.
based on trust, but on orders from above. 29 The state agencies still own the "spin-off" in the early days of the 1980s, because private ownership was not acceptable both morally and institutionally among the scientists and scholars in ZGC.
Venture capital for startups: established vs. weak
Among all the specialized services that are crucial to the IT entrepreneurial economy, the venture capital mechanism is always the top priority. Venture capital is essential to technologically risky startups with super-profit compensation when it does IPO or is acquired by other companies.
The successful transfer and implementation of venture capital ( While the availability and quality of venture capitalists is the strength of the Hsinchu-Taipei region, the lack thereof is ZGC's weakness. The underdevelopment of VC is always blamed on the delay of government approval of the technological stock exchange for startups. (It is also called the "second exchange board", which is similar to the Nasdaq). Mixed ownership. A mixture of wholly-owned/joint-venture MNCs, institutional-affiliated startups (IAS), and small privately owned firms.
Industrial Structure
Trust and learning
Horizontal Trust-based. Collective learning through participating in the global production networks.
Vertical guanxi-based learning is limited without market-based trust.
Connection with Silicon Valley
Strong "transnationalism," continuous industrial upgrading. History matters. Taiwanese overseas students have a much longer history (since 1970s).
Weak "transnationalism", most western trained engineers simply "return home" and not travel between Silicon Valley and home. Chinese overseas students have a shorter history: since the late 1980s, after the Tiananmen Square incident.
Embeddedness
Taiwanese transnational entrepreneurs are highly embedded in both regions through alumni, professional and industrial networks. Thus, it is very easy for new startups to quickly identify promising new market opportunities.
Weakly embedded in both regions. Due to relative isolation, Chinese startups often do not know how to evaluate their own technological advantage, thus resulting in redundant and repetitive innovation and poorly defined products. Secondly, the political xenophobia in the U.S. after the 911 incident pushes many foreigners including the Chinese to look for jobs outside the U.S.. Moreover, the difficulty in getting a student-visa after 911 also decreases the entrance of the Chinese postgraduate students into the U.S.. Thirdly, the attractiveness of the large Chinese market and opportunity is an important pull factor for the Chinese returnees. Fourthly, the competition of local governments in giving financial incentives to Chinese returnees to come back and start their businesses in China is also an attractive offer.
A. Four types of Chinese returnees
There are four identifiable ways in which Chinese returnees engage in ZGC's knowledge economy. I will use case studies 34 to illustrate how they operate and to indicate their contribution to the technological development of ZGC.
34 Note: all the names of the companies and the names of the owners/CEOs/directors have been changed to protect the privacy of these companies.
Type 1: Transnationalism with strong local connections
Among the four types, the "transnationalism with strong local connections" type is closer to the comparative advantage model, which is the archetype of the brain-circulation theory.
This type of Chinese returnees creates strong spatial division of labor between regions:
♦ R&D in the Silicon Valley: because of is experienced engineers and abundant venture capital;
♦ Manufacturing in Taiwan or Taiwanese OEM firms in Shanghai: because of its strength in process innovation and efficiency; and ♦ Marketing, distribution and public relation functions in ZGC: because of the political institutional resource or guanxi that are critical in opening up the domestic market, e.g. some markets need special permission from the state.
Despite the similarity on the surface, there are two critical differences between Taiwanese and Chinese transnationalism. The first difference is that the Chinese technology transfer is basically one way -from Silicon Valley to Beijing -and not reciprocal two way flows. The second difference is that the Chinese local functions are focused on the service side -namely marketing, distributing and public relations activities -and not manufacturing, as in the case of Taiwan.
Nevertheless, this is still the most advanced and complicated transnational networking, which is limited only to very experienced Chinese returnees, because it requires a high level of coordination.
Mr. Tang and the Tsinghua Tong Silicon Ltd.
Tong Silicon was set up by two Tsinghua alumni -Mr. Tang and Mr. Yong -in California in 1999. Their main target is to persuade the Chinese Digital TV working committee -a standard setting agency of the Chinese central government -to adopt their Digital TV transmission standard (terrestrial reception), while China is converting the entire analog television broadcasting system to a digital one. These Chinese returnees know very well that technology superiority is not enough without careful guanxi-building.
To realize this goal, they went back to Tsinghua University and got great support from the CEO of the Tsinghua Science Park -Professor Mei -another Tsinghua alumni, who was a senior of Mr. Tang in the college days. In fact, many of the experienced Chinese returnees belong to the same "Tsinghua Entrepreneur Group" 35 based in the Silicon Valley.
Mr. Yong was hired as a full time professor and Mr. Tong was hired as an adjunct professor in Tsinghua University. They set up a semi-public DTV Technology Center directly under the Tsinghua University to further promote their own standard (or "Tsinghua standard" as portrayed in the media) in Digital TV terrestrial transmission.
According to Mr. Tang, the major research is still done in their U.S. headquarters because most of the engineers are there and the venture capital is there as well. He argues however, that
China is where the market is. Thus, their joint-venture effort with Tsinghua is an effort to compete to be selected as the national standard in DTV transmission. Only by setting up a joint-venture with a reputable local institution (in this case the Tsinghua University) would Mr.
Tang gain the legitimacy as a Chinese "local enterprise" qualified for the standard competition.
Without this localization and repackaging process as a "nationalist enterprise" (minzu qiye) -a common practice by many Chinese returnee startups -it would be difficult to win the support of the state, the media and the public, which all have strong "techno-nationalist" sentiments.
In January 2005, the media suddenly paid attention to the intellectual property rights of 35 The Tsinghua alumni network focuses on the Tsinghua startups in the Silicon Valley focusing on the U.S. market. It was later moved back to Beijing as Tsinghua Entrepreneur and Executive Club, TEEC in April 2005.
the Tsinghua DTV standard. Theoretically, the major IPs should be owned by the Tong Silicon -an American company that created these technologies -and not Tsinghua University.
Mr. Tang quickly responded publicly that this was a rumor and misunderstanding. He criticized that the purpose of this rumor was to disqualify them in the standard competition among "nationalist enterprises." He emphasized in the newspaper and also during my interview that all the intellectual properties (IPs) will be applied through Tsinghua University. This imply that Tsinghua University will retain, or at least co-owned these IP created by Tong Silicon.
However, they were yet to work out a concrete plan 36 on how to win the standard by avoiding the political issue (e.g. an American company owned by Chinese returnees), while still managing to make profits out of their research effort (via IP ownership) done almost exclusively in the Silicon Valley.
Mr. Tang's main strategy is to use Tsinghua University as its major image to compete for the Chinese DTV standard. On the other hand, Tsinghua University also needs Tong Silicon's technologies to qualify for the quest for new DTV standard. Thus, both benefit from this strategic alliance. Interestingly, their competitor is also using the same strategy. Three Chinese returnees set up a company in the U.S. to do R&D on an alternative standard, while making a strategic join-venture with the Jiaotong University in Shanghai. In the media, the competition is always portrayed as the fight between two national universities for the national standard. This kind of default media representation fits well into the plans of these two Chinese returnee teams.
With the baggage of "technological nationalism," the Chinese returnees need extra political skills (much more than their Taiwan counterparts) to adapt to the "comparative 36 The concrete plan might be a secret that he will not release to the public at this stage.
advantage mode" of the West and China. If the IP issue is raised negatively in public (e.g. a
American company taking advantage of the Chinese manufacturers and consumers), these
Chinese returnee companies might be eliminated from the race. Thus, the truly technology-savvy Chinese returnees, such as Mr. Tang, often complain that working on the political issue is overwhelmingly more difficult than working on the technological innovation.
Despite the institutional constraint, this model is still the more promising transnational model of technological transfer as their commitment to innovation for the Chinese market is very high. Since they put all their eggs in one basket -i.e. the Chinese market, at least in the take-off period -this type of Chinese returnee startups tend to have stronger motivations to further localize their technological innovation. This is due to the deep embeddedness in the local institutions and the local market-oriented innovation strategy.
Type 2: Transnationalism with weak local connections
For Chinese returnees working in the MNCs in the West, the least risky way of returning home is to continue to work in the same or similar MNC in China. In fact, the most senior and To exploit the ZGC's knowledge assets to the MNCs' global innovation networks, these experienced Chinese returnees tend to locate their centers near the major university districts of ZGC. Tsinghua Science Park outside Tsinghua University is the most famous university-run science park. It attracts many MNCs because of its better built infrastructure and stronger alumni-student-scholar networks, as compared to other universities including the Peking University. 37 One cautionary note is that mere spatial proximity to the university clusters does not automatically allow MNCs to dominate the human resources from these top universities.
Graduate students from these top universities have plenty other job opportunities within the ZGC. To take advantage of the spatial proximity to these major campuses, MNCs need to establish collaborative internship programs, joint-research labs, joint R&D projects, and sponsor training programs between the MNCs and the universities. The effect of these programmes in exploiting the local knowledge assets is often determined by how well the Chinese returnees understand the local engineering culture, and how well they can embed in the local alumni-student-scholar networks. In this process of establishing the firm-university linkage, the double identities of some Chinese returnees -the R&D director of MNCs and the alumni (or adjunct professor) of the universities -provide the institutional linkage between the embedded local knowledge assets and the MNC's global innovation networks.
Mr. Li and Star China Research Institute (SCRI)
As the If there is any potential of technology spillover effect, it is probably the indirect demonstration effect. Mr. Li has indeed set-up a model for a new decentralized R&D project management culture, which does not only touched the hearts of his local employees, but will be emulated by others in the larger ZGC technological community mainly through media interviews, and eventually, through the mobility of engineers trained at SCRI to the local firms or local institutions.
Type 3: Localism with strong local connections
The next two types (Type 3 and type 4) of Chinese returnees come back to China with little or no transnational relations with the West. They are the majority among Chinese returnees.
Even if they have an office in the West, these offices do not involve in serious technological innovation. These two types reflect the true meaning of "Chinese returnees", as they have returned from the West and maintain little transnational innovation.
Experienced Chinese returnees are often the target of the local research institutes because of their eagerness to speed-up technology transfer and commercialization. The public research labs from the CAS and top universities have undergone serious budget cuts since the 1990s.
The leaders of these public labs are under tremendous pressure to self-finance their labs through technology licensing, provision of technological service, and spin-off institutional-affiliated startups. They believe that the Chinese returnees might be able to help them commercialize their technology rapidly.
To attract Chinese returnees to the universities, many campuses have initiatives offering adjunct professor positions and providing incentives to set up startups in the incubators or science parks run by the universities. Many Chinese returnees respond to this incentive of becoming the adjunct professor not merely because of the prestige, but because of the monetary value of this unique social capital -the ability to formally tap into the institutional resources of the top universities such as Tsinghua University.
The competitive and critical resources for adjunct professors include the eligibility for large public R&D funding, access to the public lab facilities, the right to utilize student internship programs legitimately, and frequent interactions within the alumni-student-faculty networks. By tapping into the top research institutions with one foot, the chance of survival of their startups -the other foot -is much higher. To cultivate a loyal team, he chooses to hire and train fifteen fresh graduates from the Tsinghua University, all recommended by other Tsinghua University professors. This assures their quality and loyalty to the company.
To reduce the risk of startup in ZGC, Chinese returnees try to find formal and informal ways to tap into the research institutional resources embedded in the top universities, the CAS or ZGC in general. By making strong connections with the local research institutions, Chinese returnees can utilize the public resources, such as the research labs, to reduce the cost of operation. For example, Chinese returnees in pharmaceutical startup need to collaborate with the hospital to obtain cheap sample (e.g. blood sample) for their clinical research. They also rely on university to do a lot of the testing because they cannot afford to buy all those expensive equipments as a startup in ZGC. Secondly, they have higher chance of obtaining tacit knowledge and information for obtaining public grants from the faculties. Lastly, it would be much easier to access cheap student labor in the form of flexible part-time work or internship.
By sharing cost 39 and tacit knowledge through these informal local connections, Chinese returnees contribute to the informal university-industrial linkages that can help to bridge the gab between academic research and commercial research. This type of dis-embedded startups by most Chinese returnees often faces high startup cost (often hidden) and high failure rate (often locked into low-level, repetitive innovation activities). The barriers they are facing make their situation not much better than the local startups, except that they may enjoy a few specialized incentives targeted for Chinese returnees.
B. Comparing the different types of Chinese returnees
By typologzing the Chinese returnees above, this article reveals the great internal diversity 39 The sharing of cost with the university is a tricky and flexible depending on the guanxi or bargaining skills or sometime kickbacks.
among the Chinese returnee community. On the top end of the spectrum (type 1), we have the most experienced and charismatic leaders with both transnational and local connections. On the bottom (type 4), we have the least experienced returnees (fresh graduates for example) with little guanxi-building skills. 
Figure 2: Comparing the four types of Chinese returnees and their role in technological development

Conclusion
By re-contextualizing the often neglected assumptions of the "brain-circulation" theory, this article attempts to reassess the relevance of the major hypotheses of this theory in the case of ZGC in Beijing, and in this way, caution against decontextualized application of this theory.
The critical hypotheses of the "brain-circulation" theory are based on the successful role of the Taiwanese transnational technological communities in exploiting the comparative advantages of two regional assets, and in return, facilitate technology transfer and industrial upgrading of the Hsinchu high-tech region. These critical hypotheses include: (i) decentralized industrial structure with specialized producer networks; (ii) trust-based inter-firm networks that induce learning; (iii) critical financial infrastructure for IT startups; and (iv) the role of the state in facilitating technology transfer, rather than producing technologies.
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The critical reassessment of the relevance of the "brain-circulation" theory is done through the case study of IT entrepreneurship in ZGC, Beijing. ZGC has a very different historical starting point from Hsinchu. It departs from all the major assumptions listed above. In many ways, the technological and industrial development in Taiwan's high-tech sector is pretty unique and probably hard to generalize. Thus, students of technology transfer should be more aware of the implicit hypotheses of the "brain-circulation" thesis, and thus should be more cautious in applying the "brain circulation" argument to any transnational networks. Policy makers in China and elsewhere should also be aware that Hsinchu's model of brain-circulation is very difficult to reproduce elsewhere. Saxenian herself is always cautious in the direct application of this thesis to the China and India cases. Chinese returnees that have neither transnational nor local networks will most likely repeat the high failure rate of local startups. Between these two extremes, Chinese returnees in the MNCs (with weak institutional linkage but strong personal connection to the local knowledge assets)
and Chinese returnees with weak transnational connection but strong local institutional connections will have some indirect impact though building informal linkages between the university and industries. This informal and personal linkage helps to mobilize the rich alumni-student-scholar networks of ZGC.
In sum, there are two fundamental differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese returnees that make brain-circulation a high-end act among the most experienced Chinese returnees rather than a common practice.
The first difference is in the length of the transnationalism history. Taiwan has a longer history by starting 30 years earlier than China in sending students to the US (since the 1960s).
The Taiwanese graduates have a much longer history engaging in the technological revolution in the Silicon Valley. Thus these pioneers have already acquired stronger and richer transnational networks when they began to return to Taiwan to build the Hsinchu technopoles in the late 1970s. With the number of overseas students going to the US peaking only after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese overseas students in the U.S. are considered latecomers.
Thus, it is not surprising that they form weaker transnational networks when compared to their Taiwanese counterparts. Thus, even though the transnational networks of Chinese returnees are growing, those who can manage a transnational operation (like their Taiwanese counterparts) are still rather rare and highly valuable.
Second, China is still in the process of transforming from a planned economy to a venture capital, public research labs) are still by and largely controlled by the various levels of governmental agencies. On the contrary, the Taiwanese government has been privatizing public research assets (via spin-offs) and promoting private venture capital since the early 1980s. This contrast means that in order to be successful, the Chinese returnees have to tap into the institutionalized resources, which are not yet readily available in the market. Thus, the ability to embed themselves in the local institutions and exploit the institutionalized assets becomes a determining factor of technological development.
